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In 1994, the European Union approved the Packaging and Packaging Waste 
Directive (Directive 94/62/EC) having as a primary goal to mandate the adoption of 
national legislation targeted at the increase of recovery and recycling goals by member 
States. In spite of the flexibility allowed by the EU in choosing the path towards goal 
attainment, a significant number of countries adopted voluntary agreements generally 
known as Green-Dot consortia.  
The main research question reflects this concern over the dominant governance 
structure adopted, the Green Dot agreements: Did voluntary agreements improve the 
performance of national recycling systems or did they favour collusion practices that 
dominate the industry, impose barriers to entry by new firms, and generate social 
welfare losses? 
The paper discusses the alternative governance structures to manage packaging 
waste (command-and-control regulation, market-based instruments, and voluntary 
agreements) and focuses on the economic transaction costs entailed by each of these 
alternative solutions. It is stressed that proper institutional design is crucial in order to 
minimize these transaction costs and improve the degree of efficiency of these 
governance structures. 
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In 1994, the European Union approved the Packaging and Packaging Waste 
Directive (Directive 94/62/EC) having as a primary goal to mandate the adoption of 
national legislation targeted at the increase of recovery and recycling goals by member 
States. Although Directives work as constraints to national policy implementation, one 
can also expect that national government officials and regulated industries will exhibit 
adaptive behavior in order to pursue self-interest, engaging in what Sbragia (1996) 
called the politics of circumvention. 
In spite of the flexibility allowed by the EU in choosing the path towards goal 
attainment, a significant number of countries adopted voluntary agreements generally 
known as Green-Dot consortia. These interfirm cooperation agreements aiming at 
reducing uncertainty and stabilizing interaction between actors involved in the recovery 
and recycling businesses influenced the final form of national regulation (Whiston and 
Glachant, 1996). Voluntary agreements are favoured by national firms (manufacturers, 
importers and packagers) because they allow them to keep control over the recycling 
process, while deflecting most of the cost imposed by the EU Directive through 
cooperative practices. However, the Directive triggered regulatory changes in each 
European country, opening a window of opportunity for the “capture” of the regulatory 
process by the industry.  
Voluntary agreements are considered third generation policies, following command-
and-control regulation and market-based policies. Although these agreements are 
traditionally viewed as resulting from hard bargaining and negotiation between private 
interests and governmental regulatory bodies, in the waste management sector they have 
often become associated with price controls administered by a governmental body with 
coercive powers (as the National Solid Waste Institute in Portugal) or with ‘vertical 
integration’ of solid waste management activities with the consortium dominating the 
entire process of collection, recovery, and recycling as in France (Buclet and Godard, 
2001) and Germany (Lehmann, 2004). 
The main research question reflects this concern over the dominant governance 
structure adopted, the Green Dot agreements: Did voluntary agreements improve the 
performance of national recycling systems or did they favour collusion practices that 
dominate the industry, impose barriers to entry by new firms, and generate social 
welfare losses?  
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In a recent article, Lehmann (2004) highlights the difficulty in reaching general 
conclusions about the outcomes of the adoption of Green Dot Consortia across Europe. 
The author carefully argues that, “to derive net decreases in welfare from these 
[governance structures] features by exclusively pointing to their potentially anti-
competitive effects means jumping to conclusions too quickly” (Lehmann, 2004: 445). 
The following section places the debate of national governance structures in the 
packaging sector in the appropriate context, by highlighting the implications of EU 
Directives in general and of Directive 94/62/EC in particular. In the third section, I turn 
to the governance structures adopted by EU member states and present a ‘governance 
structure triangle’ to help framing the discussion concerning national responses to the 
Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive. The fourth segment deals with the 
transaction costs faced by each specific governance structure and suggests design 
features that can help national governments to overcome these transaction costs. The 
concluding comments address directions for future research, with a special emphasis 
placed upon explaining the diversity on the evolution of governance structures and their 
characteristics resulting from political transaction costs. 
 
2. European Union Directives: Mandates for National Policy Change 
 
European Union (EU) directives can be regarded as mandates to national 
governments forcing them to develop policies in order to reach specific targets defined 
in the Directive. Some Directives are extremely detailed, specifying the goals to be 
pursued and the means to attain them. Others, however, mandate goals, but are much 
less demanding as far as the means to reach them. 
The empirical study of mandates in an intergovernmental context has been 
developed for federal and state level mandates in the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand. For example, Jenks (1994) found that, in the case of North Carolina’s counties 
compliance with a solid waste mandate, both sides were able to develop a problem-
solving approach that not only reduced the amount of conflict in implementation, but 
also improved policy outcomes creating win-win results. May (1995) analyzed the 
implementation of cooperative mandates in New South Wales (Australia) and in New 
Zealand and found that commitment and capacity by local governments are necessary to 
enable the development of facilitative implementation styles. May and Burby (1996) 
compare the performance of state hazard-mitigation mandates in Florida and New South 
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Wales in terms of procedural and substantive compliance by local governments. When 
governments are not committed to mandated policies, coercive mandates produce higher 
rates of procedural compliance. When commitment is present, cooperative policies work 
better over the long run in assuring commitment and substantive compliance. The 
dilemma is how to motivate and improve the performance of lagging jurisdictions, 
while avoiding imposing the heavy-handed tools of regulatory federalism on 
cooperative ones. What Jenks describes as a problem-solving approach to 
intergovernmental conflict is elsewhere described as cooperative mandate design (May, 
1995; May and Burby, 1996), co-production (Godschalk, 1992), and collaborative 
planning (Bollens, 1992; 1993). 
Hence, mandates can be best seen as changes in policy venues, in the sense that they 
reduce national governments’ authority to decide over a certain issue, obligating them to 
comply. In the same way, the rules established at the EU level constitute constraints that 
induce stability in national government performance. However, even though the EU 
level Directive is the same for all countries, the way it is implemented varies across 
national governments depending on national governance structures (institutional 
arrangements) and transaction costs.  
National rules confer advantages to certain individuals or groups that will oppose 
efforts to changes in rules detrimental to their own projects (Goodin, 1996). Moe (1990) 
contended that institutions are not only a way to solve problems of collective action, but 
also instruments of coercion and redistribution. Thus, institutional design is not neutral; 
it creates winners and losers and induces equilibrium in the political system, by 
favouring certain policy choices in detriment of others. In other words, because 
institutions shape preferences of individuals and groups, they also favour the 
preservation of the status quo by introducing stability in social interaction. 
The EU Packaging Directive (Directive 94/62/EC) established a 25% recycling goal, 
a 15% recycling target for each material (glass, paper, metal, and plastic), and a 50% 
recovery goal to be met by 2001. This deadline was extended to 2005 for Portugal, 
Ireland, and Greece3. These regulatory targets imposed by the Directive and the shifting 
of responsibility for managing packaging waste to the industry can be explained by an 
extensive list of factors which include the lack of landfill space, public opposition to 
                                                 
3 The New Directive sets targets for December 2008: 60% recovery, 55% recycling, 60% glass, 60% 
paper, 50% metal, 22,5% plastics, and 15% wood. The deadline for Portugal, Ireland, and Greece is 
December 2011. 
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incineration, stricter regulations on landfills and incinerators and bans on waste imports 
by European countries. The push for the principle of producer responsibility included in 
the Directive was also strengthened by the perception that marketing purposes motivate 
packaging decisions (Ackerman, 1997). 
Some criticisms to the Directive were that it was “a regulatory method of waste 
control (…) developed in an attempt to make the ‘polluter pay’” and that “command and 
control approaches, such as recycling and source reduction targets are most likely to be 
cost-ineffective and dynamically inefficient, as firms will have little or no incentive to 
develop new technologies which facilitate high recycling rates or light-weighting.” 
(Turner, 1996: 460-1). These criticisms may have proved premature, as more and more 
countries adopted the Green Dot governance structures and these arrangements were 
refined to correct for the initial problems. 
The following section presents distinct governance structures employed around the 
world to manage the recycling sector. The discussion is framed by the conceptualization 
of recycling governance structures as a triangle, where market, hierarchy, and voluntary 
solutions are the three vertices. The goal is to identify governance features that will 
allow placement of real world examples within this triangle, in order to compare 
different systems by linking structural characteristics to performance.  
 
3. Variability in Packaging Recycling Governance Structures 
 
The literature on new institutionalism in economics has presented discussions of the 
make-or-buy decision faced by firms in the economic market. Similarly, the adoption of 
the producer responsibility principle by Directive 94/62/EC forced firms from the 
packaging industry to face a choice: either cooperate through voluntary arrangements or 
stay isolated in the market and recycle their own packaging waste. This last option, as 
we shall see, was not truly an option, given the astronomic collection and sorting costs 
and practical difficulties faced by retail manufacturers in the recycling market. 
The degree of intervention (contract features) becomes a matter of weighting the 
market transaction costs faced by firms against the transaction costs experienced by the 
different hierarchical arrangements (contracts). As Coase correctly put it, “the problem 
is to avoid the more serious harm” (1960: 2). In other words, the number of decisions 
concerning a recycling policy can be left to the market, dealt with voluntary agreements 
or centralized at the national level (hierarchy). Most likely, it will be a mixed solution, 
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making it necessary to identify criteria to evaluate the positioning of each national 
government recycling policy. 
In the case of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive, the majority of EU 
countries opted for a mixed solution: mandate goals and make firms operating in this 
sector responsible for managing packaging and packaging waste, while allowing the 
creation of voluntary agreements (similar to Green Dot) to facilitate recovery and 
recycling of packaging materials. The rationale behind this approach is the uncertainty 
regarding governance structure technical and financial performance as well as different 
civic and social background of EU member states.  
Some authors point out the merits and problems involved in target mandates 
coupled with a more decentralized implementation. On one hand, the simultaneous 
development of competing governance structures allows comparisons of performance as 
well as socially tailored solutions. On the other hand, it may increase negative 
externalities adversely affecting interstate trade and environmental protection (Buclet 
and Godard, 2001).  
Taking the Packaging Waste Directive as a given, national strategies of 
implementation can be best described using a triangle with the three vertices being 
market-based strategies, voluntary/cooperative agreements and command-and-
control/deterrence based strategies. These vertices can be regarded as ideal types and 
help frame the national tendencies as far as the implementation of EU Directives. The 
governance structure triangle is depicted in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Governance Structure Triangle 
 
Hierarchy 
                    
 
Voluntary Solution   Market 
 
 
This section attempts to summarize the diversity present in packaging recycling 
governance structures by characterising them according to policy instruments employed 
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by national governments. The goal is to identify the instruments that would be used if 
national governments decided to adopt each of the three governance structures. 
 
3.1. Market-Based Solutions 
 
A market-based organization of the recycling process entails, almost by definition, 
minimal government intervention. The consequences of having a free market operating 
in this sector will be discussed in section four, but it is generally agreed that market-
based strategies do not imply government laissez-faire. The adoption of economic 
incentives can also be regarded as market oriented, even if this implies governments 
actively legislating the implementation of these instruments. 
The UK 1997 Packaging ordinance employs a form of tradable permits (Producer 
Responsibility Notes) to implement the polluter-pays principle. This governance 
structure stimulates competition between independent recycling and compliance 
schemes allowing producer companies to take full responsibility for recycling or shop 
around for the best deals. Although the UK system is the closest to a market-based one 
(right hand side of the triangle above), there is still a large governmental role, contrary 
to what some have argued (Strobl and Langford, 2002). The governance structure is 
based upon market mechanisms and economic instruments, but these are engineered and 
approved in national legislation. The UK Environment Agency is also responsible for 
monitoring producer compliance and mandating earmarking of reprocessor revenues for 
reinvestment in the recycling sector (Bailey, 2000). 
The work of Buclet and Godard (2001) mentions other countries employing 
different economic incentives to accomplish recycling management goals. The United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, France, and Italy, among others, apply 
landfill taxes to increase the relative cost of this form of elimination and bridge the cost 
gap between landfilling and recycling. Italy taxed plastic bags until the mid 1990s to 
stimulate substitution for other forms of packaging. France, Italy, and Greece renounce 
the establishment of a rigid hierarchy of technical options for managing waste, leaving 
local actors the task of defining the best combination of waste management strategies. 
All these examples have in common economic incentives and/or reduction of 
government intervention in the waste management sector. In comparison with the UK 
example, stated in the previous paragraph, these are piecemeal reforms, but, when 
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adopted simultaneously, demonstrate a strong market orientation of national 
governments. 
 
3.2. Voluntary Solutions 
 
Voluntary agreements to manage the recycling of packaging waste were first 
adopted in Germany, in the beginning of the 1990s. The Duales System Deutschland 
(DSD) organisation (a governance structure, if you will) licenses a trademark (the Green 
Dot) to producers, importers and packagers in exchange for a fee charge based on the 
quantity and types of packaging materials employed by manufacturers. The license fees 
charged by Green Dot consortia to its members are then used to pay waste haulers 
and/or municipal corporations for the collection of waste packaging materials. These 
governance structures are voluntary in a double sense. Firstly, they are cooperative 
arrangements between the national regulatory authority or agency in charge of 
implementing the EU Directive and the packaging industry to avoid the “heavy hand” 
tools of command-and-control legislation. Secondly, the agreements are self-governance 
structures between several members of the industry, including producers, 
manufacturers, importers, and recyclers, among others. 
With only a few exceptions, most EU member countries adopted the Green Dot 
form of voluntary agreements to manage packaging waste4. However, these governance 
structures have slight variations among member states, making them more market or 
hierarchically oriented depending upon the policy instruments used by national 
governments. A few examples should clarify this argument. 
The UK allows the formation of compliance schemes similar to Green Dot, but 
these operate in a competitive environment with other schemes and independent 
recyclers5. In contrast, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands 
employ regulatory policies to reduce packaging, with the Dutch and the Finns taking 
this approach a step further and including actual reduction goals, similar to CO2 
emission standards. Portugal has a governmental agency with coercive powers (the 
National Solid Waste Institute) responsible for yearly setting one single value to be paid 
                                                 
4 The exceptions are Finland and Italy. The United Kingdom has compliance schemes very similar to the 
Green Dot consortia, but the overall governance structure in place is clearly market-based in nature. In 
The Netherlands, voluntary agreements took the form of covenants between the interest groups involved 
in the packaging industry, subjected to enforcement by the national government. 
5 The competitive environment depends upon market structure, among other things, as we shall see in 
section four. 
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for each type of material collected by accredited collection organizations, usually local 
government authorities or municipal corporations (Garcia, 2004). In this case, not only 
the market is completely absent, but also government intervention is extremely intrusive 
in voluntary arrangements, since it dictates the price that the Green Dot Consortium 
pays to local collection agencies and enterprises. 
 
3.3. Hierarchical Solutions 
 
Undoubtedly, the last example provides a nice link to discuss hierarchical solutions. 
The Portuguese case demonstrates that, more often than not, governments opt for the 
most intrusive policies, without allowing other, more spontaneous (organic) solution to 
evolve. As section four will show, when transaction costs are fairly low and the number 
of actors is relatively small, market arrangements or contracts are able to flourish 
between private actors. This could certainly be the case for the price to be paid to 
collection agencies by the Green Dot Consortium. Supporting government intervention 
using price controls, without first studying and attempting market-based or voluntary 
solutions seems, at least in theory, hasty, unwise, and overkill.  
Even if private actors are inevitably present throughout the whole packaging waste 
recycling process, governments can play very different roles in the market. Mandatory 
deposit-return systems, minimum-recycling quotas, producer responsibility established 
by law are only but a few examples of command-and-control type of regulatory actions. 
As expressed previously, each of the governance structures is an ideal type and none 
can be enacted in its pure form. Hence, hierarchical solutions are also implemented 
using different voluntary and market-based solutions. 
Legislation in Germany and the Netherlands established a strict hierarchy of 
technical options, sponsoring ‘public technological interventionism’ in order to 
accomplish national environmental goals (Buclet and Godard, 2001). Yet, this policy 
sends the correct message to private actors in the market place, since it highlights 
national priorities and redirects investments to new technology in order to accomplish 
these goals. Rather than being a simple command-and-control regulation, this approach 
can stimulate competition by promoting innovative technical options and broadening 
the range of solutions available in the future. 
In contrast, the UK provides the finest example of government facilitating markets 
while abstaining from excessive, unduly intervention. However, even in this case, 
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government was responsible for engineering the market-based system, and still monitors 





Throughout this section, I have presented three governance structures employed by 
EU member states to comply with Directive 94/62/EC. The discussion has shown 
significant contrasts between countries, with the UK making a significant use of 
economic instruments and assisting the market in accomplishing the targets set by 
national and EU legislation, the Netherlands and France, albeit differently, relying more 
in voluntary agreements between representatives of the packaging sector and the 
respective governments, Germany opting for an approach heavily centred on DSD (from 
collection to recovery), with less government intervention and, finally, Portugal 
adopting a voluntary scheme heavily reliant on central government intervention. 
 
Figure 2 – Relative Placement of EU Member States 
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The three vertices of the governance structure triangle are ideal types and cannot be 
found in real world applications. However, they provided the appropriate setting to 
make comparisons between the relative positions of countries. A preliminary attempt to 
carry out this task is made in figure 2. 
It is important to highlight that this is a very rudimentary attempt to locate each 
governance structure within the triangle, with respect to the ideal types and each other. 
As we have implicitly assumed so far, each governance structure has relative merits and 
problems, which should be dealt with in the context of its practical implementation. The 
following section begins to uncover some of these problems, using a transaction costs 
framework to accomplish this goal.   
 
4. Packaging Waste Governance Structures: A Transaction Costs Analysis 
 
An analysis of these governance structures using a transaction costs framework 
gives a better understanding of their relative advantages and difficulties. Here, Directive 
94/62/EC is taken as a given, affecting the packaging sector (manufacturers, importers, 
packagers) in all EU countries and the analysis will be focused on the perceived costs of 
the laws and the actions undertaken by national actors to minimize the costs of 
burdensome regulations. The governance structure adopted in each particular instance is 
the most attractive from the point of view of the profit-maximizing firms, according to 
the logic of economic efficiency and within the constraints imposed by the mandate 
legislation. This should be particularly true for countries predominantly adopting 
voluntary solutions, since these arrangements are regarded by the industry as better 
suited to deal with the technological uncertainty and complexity of the packaging sector 
(Whiston and Glachant, 1996). In any case, the incentive structure present in the 
institutional arrangement is decisive to make the actors further the goals of the 
regulations (Moe, 1984). 
This section starts with a discussion of transaction costs frequently present in 
recycling markets, hindering free market solutions and contributing for the search of 
 11
alternatives within the market framework. Next, we turn to voluntary solutions adopted 
by many EU member states and pinpoint transaction costs more likely to be found in, or 
as a result of, these arrangements. While transaction costs thwarting market and 
voluntary arrangements are inherently different, they nevertheless help to explain 
failures in these structures in accomplishing the goals they intended to.  
 
4.1. Recycling Market Transaction Costs and Alternative Solutions within a Market 
Framework  
 
The existence of significant transaction costs in the recycling market, including 
excessive fragmentation, lack of technical information, and reduced secondary market 
development, especially on the end users’ side of the market, prevents packaging waste 
collection and recycling transactions from occurring. In other words, because the market 
does not operate efficiently, the amount of packaging materials collected to be recycled 
is significantly lower than the one that could be obtained under a different governance 
structure or arrangement. More generally, different governance structures imply varying 
transaction costs which, in turn, lead to different degrees of efficiency in resource uses.  
If the recycling market is left to its own devices, the number of transactions will be 
extremely low, due to severe distortions in prices and incentives. The literature reports 
some of these problems, both on the supply side and the demand side of the recycling 
market. The uncertainty present in recycling markets due to information failure with 
regards to the quantity and quality of supply and demand, leads to price ambivalence 
and dissuades investment decisions (Stromberg, 2004). A steady supply stream of 
secondary raw materials is absolutely necessary, if these undesirable price and 
investment inefficiencies are to be corrected. Government mandated collection and 
recycling targets are means to improve the quantity of supply, even if the quality of 
secondary raw materials has sometimes been affected (Sutherland, 2001). 
Recycling markets have also frequently faced difficulties at the end users’ side of 
the market. Since producers are not forced to pay for the true cost of disposal, virgin 
materials are still preferred over recycled ones. Even if aware of this, manufacturers are 
faced with significant difficulties in replacing virgin materials with recycled ones in 
their production processes, because government policies targeted to this goal have been 
absent and perverse incentives are still prevailing: regulation clearly favours the use of 
virgin materials over recycled ones (Ackerman, 1997). Sutherland (2001) points to 
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specific reasons for this resistance to change, namely the expensiveness of replacing 
manufacturing technology in order to be able to use recycled materials, the time frame 
required to get all the infrastructure in place, and, finally, the levels at which these 
investments must be made, usually involving not only the municipal level of 
government but also regional and national governments. Information distortions also 
contribute to inefficient decisions in the recycling market, because manufacturers prefer 
virgin materials, usually imported at higher prices, to recycled materials that could be 
obtained at lower cost and readily available from local or regional recyclers (Ackerman, 
1997). 
In order to overcome the inefficiencies resulting from a freewheeling market, the 
United Kingdom (UK) adopted, in 1997, Packaging Regulations that would allow the 
creation and implementation of a recycling market facilitated by minimal government 
intervention. A Producer Responsibility Note (PRN) is issued (sold) by accredited 
recyclers to producers or compliance schemes (similar to Green Dot). These become 
responsible for submitting them to the Environment Agency, which also monitors 
producer compliance (Bailey, 2000). 
The UK governance structure is clearly market-oriented, since the PRN is an 
application of the producer-pays principle. However, this market is far from perfect. 
Many authors have pointed some of the inefficiencies present, namely that producers 
can disengage themselves from the recycling process, making government monitoring 
an expensive and highly uncertain task. Market distortions also include findings that 
some reprocessors withhold PRNs in order to drive up the price, market prominence of 
VALPAK (a consortia similar to DSD with over 60% of market share) practicing lower 
prices makes other schemes less attractive to packaging companies, and, finally, the 
lack of reinvestment of recycling revenues in new technology and innovation (Bailey, 
2000; Strobl and Langford, 2002). 
The difficulties faced by the UK governance structure can be explained by the fact 
that this is a market-based policy and not the actual market at work. Since this is a 
human engineered solution, policy details are likely to be missing, hence contributing to 
inefficient outcomes. In examining the Welsh case, Watts, Probert, and Bentley (2001) 
refer that the UK’s market-based strategy has faced severe problems due to the lack of 
market development. Their study of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises 
concluded that the lack of supply was the most significant aspect in the glass sector, 
whereas the paper and board users were especially concerned with information 
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asymmetries regarding the quality of their products. These issues need to be addressed 
in order to stimulate investments in the package-recycling sector. 
A set of policy instruments can be employed in order to overcome these difficulties 
and secure the development of the demand-side of secondary markets. I will address 
three types of policy instruments: labelling, government-industry partnerships for 
technology development, and economic incentives.  
It is generally believed that full disclosure of a product’s recycled content is likely 
to attract consumers with strong environmental preferences. However, the currently 
practiced Green Dot labelling does not provide specific information about each 
product’s recycled contents. Hence, consumers are unable to reward manufacturers for 
their use of secondary rather than virgin materials, and this refrains producers from 
larger investments in recycled materials6. 
The use of secondary materials by manufacturers can also be stimulated by 
technological development. Ackerman (1997) pointed the difficulties faced by 
industries wishing to employ secondary materials, mainly resulting from technology 
lock-ins using virgin materials. In order to alter this path dependency, Sutherland (2001) 
suggests partnerships between governmental organisations such as research laboratories 
or university department and industries wishing to use new technology adapted to 
recycled materials.  
Finally, economic incentives play a decisive role in the development of 
secondary markets. Economic incentives include loans and grants aimed at funding 
capital and start-up costs, tax incentives and investment tax credits creating exemption 
from property taxes or from sales taxes on new recycling equipment, and the removal of 
all kinds of virgin material subsidies and preferences in order to improve the 
competitive position of recycled materials in the marketplace (Ackerman, 1997; 
Sutherland, 2001).  
Government mandated recycling programs are likely to generate large quantities of 
scrap materials for which end markets are necessary. By employing proper economic 
tools and incentives to stimulate the demand-side of the market, governments anticipate 
the inevitably large increase in recycling materials collected that will result.   
 
                                                 
6 The use of the Green Dot label on packaging does not provide this type of information, since it simply 
checks that criteria are met in awarding the Green Dot mark. Information regarding the percentage of 
secondary materials employed in manufacturing each specific product is absent.  
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4.2. Voluntary Arrangements and Economic Transaction Costs  
 
The UK system is clearly distinct, some might say, totally opposed to the voluntary 
agreements adopted by the majority of European Union countries. By the time the EU 
Packaging Directive was adopted, in 1994, Germany had been experiencing with the 
Duales System Deutschland (DSD) for a couple of years7. The remarkable success 
experienced by the Green Dot governance structure in its first year of existence, is 
confirmed by the huge amount of materials collected, resulting in Germany immediately 
reaching and surpassing the targets established by the EU Directive that was only 
adopted one year later. Although the DSD was highly successful in terms of collection 
rates, a few system features proved to be problematic and had to be adjusted. 
In spite of the initial difficulties, the DSD governance structure and the Green Dot 
trademark became incredibly successful, as the Packaging Recovery Organisation 
Europe (PRO Europe) founded in December 1996 exported the system to twenty-six 
countries and registered the Green Dot trademark in 170 countries. In light of the 
problems discussed regarding market-based solutions, the obvious question is then, 
what are the net benefits (if there are any) of the Green Dot arrangement over the 
market solution?  
Green Dot agreements are remarkable and ingenious governance structures in the 
sense that they help firms to deal with an expensive mandate, by significantly 
minimizing transaction costs that would occur in a free market. Mutual benefits 
resulting from negotiation and compromise accrue to the actors involved in these 
agreements and are only possible because governance structures can be designed to 
minimize economic transaction costs, facilitate cooperation and improve everyone’s 
welfare.  
The flexibility allowed by the EU to national governments in implementing the 
Directive can be seen as defensible in Coasian terms. Just like Coase (1937; 1960) 
proposed that certain market transactions involving large negotiation and monitoring 
costs should be integrated under the hierarchy of the firm, it can be argued that, due to 
inefficiencies detected in recycling markets, voluntary agreements are able to reduce 
transaction costs and achieve more efficient solutions. In the case of recycling market 
transactions, information and search costs may be too high, so that command-and-
                                                 
7 Germany’s decision to adopt and implement new regulations to recycle packaging waste inspired, at 
least in part, the decision of the EU Commission to design Directive 94/62 (Whiston and Glachant, 1996).  
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control or target-based regulation coupled with voluntary arrangements such as DSD are 
able to economize on these costs. 
During the 10 years of experience with DSD, German authorities were able to 
correct many of the initial difficulties faced by this voluntary system, namely the 
excessive supply of recycling materials collected and injected to secondary markets 
causing abrupt price falls8, increase recycling capacity, and renegotiate contracts with 
local authorities and collection companies to reduce costs and promote adequate sorting 
of recyclables (Ackerman, 1997). Most of these problems resulted from the urgency 
placed upon recycling and recovery in Germany in the beginning of the 1990s, and did 
not appear in subsequent experiences.  
Even when some problems remain, such as in the case of German waste paper 
market, solutions may reside downstream and not upstream. Baumgärtner and Winkler 
(2003) argue that waste management legislation turned supply of waste paper 
independent from its price and demand, frequently causing large drops in prices, but the 
answer to this is the development of the end users’ side of the market, not a 
modification in legislation.  
Several authors point out, however, that the main problem of DSD, as well as other 
Green Dot Consortia, is the extremely high costs entailed in operating the whole system 
(Ackerman, 1997; Strobl and Langford, 2002; Turner, 1996). Although this is probably 
true, the effectiveness of this governance structure was never called into question in 
technical and organisational terms, given the high recycling and recovery rates it 
achieves. Market-based systems, however promising they may be, do not present a track 
record such as the Green Dot Consortia with respect to delivering results. 
 Many criticisms to Green Dot voluntary agreements focus on the anti-competitive 
nature of these arrangements. Yet, Lehmann (2004) argues that seemingly anti-
competitive features of voluntary agreements may actually display economic merits in 
the relationship with both downstream and upstream firms. In order to avoid 
inefficiency due to excessive centralization, DSD resembles a lot like a consumer 
cooperative, since companies are able to become co-owners at any time, the share 
amount is restricted by statute and transfer can only occur with the consent of a 
shareholders’ meeting, and surpluses are channelled to reserves, decreased fees, or to 
                                                 
8 This was especially true for paper and plastics, leading to German waste exports to other European 
countries causing prices to drop, elimination rather than recycling in foreign countries, and, ultimately, 
the use of plastics in the steel industry, resulting in a dodgy process similar to incineration (Ackerman, 
1997).  
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compensate poor managerial performance. Free rider problems that are likely to occur 
in the context of dispersed ownership were solved with the appointment of waste 
recovery industry representatives to the DSD supervisory board. 
As far as upstream firms, the author explains that anti-competitive features such as 
asset specificity and long-term contracts placing waiting costs on new, more efficient, 
competitors are offset by governance structure features such as the representation of 
waste recovery firms on the DSD’s supervisory board, collective bargaining between 
waste recovery firms and DSD, and subcontracting between waste recovery firms. 
 
4.3. Transaction Costs and Institutional Design  
 
The previous points have shown that each governance structure can fail, if lacking 
appropriate institutional design features. Lehmann’s work demonstrates that governance 
structures such as DSD can be tailored to minimize transaction costs and avoid many 
inefficient outcomes of their operation. Certainly, DSD has improved many of the 
negative aspects detected in the initial stages of its operation. When institutional design 
lacks the adequate incentives to further mandate goals, the result is inefficient behaviour 
by the actors and welfare losses for society.  
In the Portuguese case, the compensation value paid by the Green Dot Consortium 
to waste collection authorities is set by the national government9, thereby allowing for 
heavy lobbying by the packaging industry and waste collection authorities. Since the 
compensation value is negotiated every year, these inefficiencies are multiplied by the 
number of times negotiation occurs, leading to large rent-seeking costs. Recent 
experience shows that the packaging sector may be winning the wrestling match with 
waste collection companies, with executives of the latter threatening to sell their 
collected recyclables to the Spanish Green Dot Consortia – EcoEmbalajes España 
S.A.10, if a higher compensation value is not adopted. Deadweight losses resulting from 
this tug-of-war could certainly be avoided had a different design – collective bargaining, 
for example – been adopted. Hence, design is everything.  
 
 
                                                 
9 In fact, the process is even more complex and the consequences potentially more serious, since the 
National Waste Institute outsources the job to an auditing firm. 




In the study of governance structures, functionalist explanations, i.e., explaining the 
causes of institutional change by their consequences should be avoided (Alston, 1996). 
It would be premature to conclude that, because Green Dot arrangements are extremely 
successful all over Europe, the Packaging industry must have lobbied the EU for the 
passage of the EU Directive 94/62/EC. Although this may be true to a certain extent, 
competing explanations seem to be as plausible.  
The high level of uncertainty in the recycling market, particularly in the packaging 
sector, has triggered voluntary agreements between the regulators and the industry, 
allowing for an unlimited search for alternatives and collaboration between the actors 
involved. For this reason, I would argue that governance structures in the packaging-
recycling sector are not inefficient by nature; they become inefficient as a result of 
inappropriate design features and incentives to actors. 
Moreover, the choice of specific governance structures at the national level did not 
occur by chance, but as a result of the recognition by national actors that certain 
governance structures were clearly more beneficial to the packaging sector as a whole. 
However, voluntary agreements in general, and Green Dot Consortia in particular, 
evolved in different directions depending upon the structure of the regulated industry, 
the role of political institutions and the actors on all sides of the field. The diversity of 
experiences with the Green Dot Consortium governance structure suggests hypotheses 
regarding different implementation strategies of the EU Packaging and Packaging 
Waste Directive at the national level.  
A general assessment of voluntary arrangements indicates that the diversity features 
and frequent changes in design may be the result of very different motivations, 
including self governance improvements, correction of blatant inefficiencies, pressure 
of interest group activity, and politically triggered action from governments at different 
levels (national, regional, and local). Since more empirical analysis and case study 
research is clearly needed to explore the implementation of the Directive, future 








Ackerman, Frank. 1997. Why Do We Recycle? Markets, Values, and Public Policy. 
Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
Alston, Lee J. 1996. “Empirical Work in Institutional Economics: An Overview”. In 
Lee J. Alston, Thráinn Eggertsson, and Douglass North (ed.). Empirical Studies in 
Institutional Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Baumgärtner, Stefan and Ralph Winkler. 2003. “Markets, Technology and 
Environmental regulation: Price Ambivalence of Waste Paper in Germany”. Ecological 
Economics 47: 183-195. 
 
Bollens, Scott. 1992. “State Growth Management: Intergovernmental Frameworks and  
Policy Objectives”. Journal of the American Planning Association 58, 4: 454-467.  
 
Bollens, Scott. 1993. “Restructuring Land Use Governance”. Journal of Planning 
Literature 7: 211-226. 
 
Buclet, Nicolas and Olivier Godard. (2001). “The Evolution of Municipal Waste 
Management in Europe: How Different Are National Regimes?”. Journal of 
Environmental Policy and Planning 3: 303-317. 
 
Coase, Ronald. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm”. Econometrica 4, 3: 386-405.  
 
Coase, Ronald. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost”. Journal of Law and Economics 3, 
1: 1-44. 
 
Garcia, Ricardo. 2004. Sobre a Terra: Um Guia para Quem Lê e Escreve sobre 
Ambiente. Lisboa: Público. 
 
Godschalk, David R. 1992. “Implementing Coastal Zone Management: 1972-1990”. 
Coastal Management 20, 3: 93-116. 
 
Goodin, Robert E. 1996. “Institutions and Their Design”. In Robert E. Goodin. The 
Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Jenks, Stephen. 1994. “County Compliance with North Carolina’s Solid Waste 
Mandate: A Conflict Based Model”. Publius: The Journal Of Federalism. 24, 1: 17-36. 
 
Lehmann, Markus A. (2004). “Voluntary Environmental Agreements and Competition 
Policy: The Case of the German System for Packaging Waste Management”. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 28: 435-449. 
 
May, Peter J. 1995. “Can Cooperation Be Mandated? Implementing Intergovernmental 
Management in New South Wales and New Zealand”. Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 25, 1: 89-113. 
  
 19
May, Peter J. and Raymond J. Burby. 1996. “Coercive versus Cooperative Policies: 
Comparing Intergovernmental Mandate Performance”. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 15, 2: 171-201. 
 
Moe, Terry M. 1984. “The New Economics of Organization”. American Journal of 
Political Science 28, 4: 739-77. 
 
Moe, Terry M. 1990. “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story”. Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, Special Issue: 213-253. 
 
Sbragia, Alberta. (1996). Debt Wish: Entrepreneurial Cities, U.S. Federalism, and 
Economic Development. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
 
Strobl, Barbara L. and Ian H. Langford. 2002. “UK Implementation of the EU 
Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive: Can a Market Based System Achieve 
Economic and Environmental Goals?”. CSERGE Working Paper ECM 02-02. 
 
Stromberg, Per. 2004. “Market Imperfections in Recycling Markets: Conceptual Issues 
and Empirical Study of Price Volatility in Plastics”. Resources Conservation and 
Recycling 41: 339-364. 
 
Sutherland, Gregg D. 2001. “Market Development: Problems and Solutions”. In Herbert 
Lund (ed.). The McGraw-Hill Recycling Handbook. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Turner, R. Kerry. 1996. “Waste Management”. In François Léveque (ed.). 
Environmental Policy in Europe: Industry, Competition, and the Policy Process. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Watts, Bevis M., Jane Probert, and Stephen P. Bentley. 2001. “Developing Markets for 
Recyclate: Perspectives from South Wales”. Resources, Conservation and Recycling 32: 
293-304. 
 
Whiston, Thomas and Matthieu Glachant. 1996. “Voluntary Agreement Between 
Industry and Government – The Case of Recycling Regulations”. In François Léveque 
(ed.). Environmental Policy in Europe: Industry, Competition, and the Policy Process. 




António F. Tavares was born in Vila Nova de Gaia, Portugal. He has a M.A. degree in 
Public Administration from the University of Minho, Portugal and a Ph.D. in Public 
Administration from Florida State University, USA, with a specialization in public 
policy. He teaches at his alma mater, the University of Minho at Braga, in the 
Department of International Relations and Public Administration. His research interests 
include solid waste management, land use management and urban growth, and policy 
analysis. He has published in the International Journal of Economic Development and 
the Review of Public Administration and Policy (in Portuguese). 
 
 20
